Abstract: The process of the transformation from life to art no doubt entails corresponding changes in the other aspects of the art activity. This process starts at the level of language and moves up to that of the abiding emotion which determines the nature of the art-experience. Art may be said to transcend the very object whose idea it imitates- art in this sense transcends reality. This paper looks in depth at the various creative and artistic forms of expression that prevail in Indian art. It also draws comparison to the artistic ways of the western body of creativity concepts.
Keywords: imitation art, mimesis, art forms, real life art, western art concepts, Kathakali Koodiyattam, aesthetic communications, aesthetic
“Art imitates Nature” is an oft-quoted statement, which is agreed upon by appreciators of fine art, both in India and the West. This seemingly simple statement carries a host of complex connotations, which a true lover of art is duty-bound to interpret. An attempt is made here to re-interpret the concept of “imitation” in art, which in Sanskrit is referred to as anukrti and in the West is called “mimesis” and to bring out the inherent paradox that exists within these terms.
When examined closely, what “imitation” actually involves is a “denial” of itself, or rather a “reversal” of it. The mimetic process in art may be compared to the reflection of an object in the mirror, which inverts images laterally but not vertically. Similarly when a work of art holds up the mirror to Nature, there is such an inversion or partial reversal of worldly objects. Such a finding does not, however, dismiss the importance of the various mimetic “processes” which transform an aspect of Nature into an artefact; it means that the more of an interiorised activity art becomes, the less “imitative” it becomes, of a particular object or objects in real life.
The process of the transformation from life to art no doubt entails corresponding changes in the other aspects of the art activity. This process starts at the level of language and moves up to that of the abiding emotion which determines the nature of the art-experience. Such a “movement”, from the life-object to the art image, would roughly involve a change from the level of language, through action to that of emotion.
1. Language — plain, abhidha — irony/implied meaning, vyanjana.
2. Action — actor, naṭa character, pātra — spectator, sahṛdaya — stylisation, natya dharmi
3. Emotion — life-emotion, bhāva — art-emotion, rasa.
At the level of language, the progression from the denotative to the implied is effected through suggestion, dhvani, where the implied meaning surfaces by suppressing the literal meaning. The concept of imitation assumes importance in Indian theory in respect of language, since anukrti is viewed there in relation to the structure of language as well as its semantics. It is important in this context to examine how the imitative process operates in the major schools of Indian criticism.
The theory of propriety, aucitya, implies that the attempt in art to imitate an activity suited for a person is realised and fulfilled by identifying that characteristic activity with the person himself. It could be said that according to the theory of aucitya the “activity”, for instance, the conduct of a king, “imitates” the person, the king. The act of imitation, it would then seem, becomes the imitation of the action.
Similarly with the theory of deviant language vakrokti — what cannot be effectively communicated when expressed in a direct way is deliberately expressed in another, less direct way; in a sense therefore the indirect expression, ukti, tries to “imitate” what can be expressed directly, uktam.
So too, with the theory of figurative language alamktara. If one takes the example of simile uparna, it describes an object to be “like” another; here too the process involved is imitation at the language-level. Literature, which itself involves imitation, becomes doubly so when it employs metaphoric language. A kind of language-within-language pattern is found, when, in figure of speech like simile and metaphor, reference to a “likeness” is made within language.
Suggestion, dhvani, also attempts to create an implied sense vyangyartha by “imitating” through a word, sabda, a certain denoted expression. The unstated element which is suppressed within the literal statement, abhidha, gets primacy when dhvani conies into operation. Even an echo, which is essentially a sound, is only an “imitation” of the source of the echo, and becomes diluted with every re-echo.
At the level of action, the total effect is achieved when the movements and gestures are stylised and symbolically presented; in other words, it is. the progression from the normal behavioural pattern, lokadharmi , to conventional gestures, natyadharmi . Even in the verbal art, the activity is once removed from reality, since it is words that are employed to communicate experience instead of real-life objects. In the performing art, gestures are employed in place of words, while in the plastic art, the medium that is used becomes the very agent that distances it from reality. It is only when something which is itself not “real” assumes the role of the real that art becomes aesthetically convincing. The Indian aesthetician brings in the description of the painted horse, citraturaga, to prove this point. The painting of a horse, though not the real horse, is “assumed” to be the real one and is referred to as “that horse” and not “that painting of a horse”. Each life-object therefore has a three-fold function
Horse
(object)
“horse” horse
(word) (painting)
An abnormally dwarfish-looking horse would be artistically “real”, in a given context, while the same in real life could be repulsive. It is the idealised condition, avastha, of “horseness” that gains importance here, just as Aristotle’s idea does, since imitation takes place not of life as it is actually experienced, but as it ought to be experienced. What Aristotle chooses to call the idea may be said to correspond to Bharata’s concept of avastha-in both cases the less relevant aspects or gross details of physical features of what is imitated are eliminated. This implies that imitation in art is always highly selective. The idea or avastha itself becomes a self-transcendental form of reality. Hence art may be said to transcend the very object whose avastha it imitates- art in this sense transcends reality.
In Indian theory, there is a swing from the determinant vibhava, which characterises the personal/particular to the aesthetic emotion, rasa, which characterises the impersonal/universal. At the level of emotion, this movement is effected through impersonalisation, sadharanikarana, by which the particular, vyaktigata, becomes the universal, samastigata. It is acknowledged in the western world too that the art-image could be personal or impersonal, representing the subjective world and the objective world respectively. The more “impersonal” the image, the more universal it tends to be This is an accepted concept in Indian aesthetics and is referred to as sadaranikarana. The movement from one to the other includes within itself most of the western concepts like behaviourism, naturalism and realism, which may be classified under “low” mimesis, leading on to symbolism, myth and archetype, where the point of “high” mimesis is reached.
When the personal image transcends itself and becomes the impersonal art-image, rasa, the imitation, anukrti of various factors can be seen operating simultaneously. Stylisation, distancing and the resultant universalisation can be said to be the most important among these factors, and they are integral to art-criticism in both Indian and western theories. The actor, at least for a brief period of time, tries to “become” the character; here too the process involved is imitation. The audience also tries to assimilate the actor’s performance; in both these cases there is the process of internalisation through imitation. This is what, one can argue, marks the distinctness of Indian art-forms like Kathakali and Koodiyattom.
It would seem paradoxical that the maximum degree of internalisation in these art-forms co-exist with an equal degree of aesthetic distancing. In Kathakali, for instance, the actor is required not to absorb wholly the character’s emotions into himself. He should only create an illusion of portraying any particular emotion-laughter or tears or anger as the case may be-for the next moment he may have to represent a totally different emotion, pakarnnattam. In both Kathakali and Koodiyattam, an actor who represents a character in the act of crying, only moves his fingers over his cheeks and even takes care not to touch the cheeks with the fingers. The rest is left to the responsive imagination, bhavayitri pratiba, of the spectator. The actor therefore merely indicates the emotion. The more there is of such distancing, the more universal the portrayal of emotion becomes. This universality resulting from distancing may be compared to man’s experience of the image of the moon, which, owing to the distance, looks the same size when viewed from anywhere on earth. But a tree, which is much closer than the moon, appears different in size when viewed from different distances.
The same is the case with the costumes, aharyam, in Kathakali and Koodiyattom. It is used to achieve, more than anything else, a maximum possible aesthetic distance. The characters when dressed up do not seem to belong to any particular region, caste or community. In this way the actor achieves a kind of universality. The western concept of realism tries to make the actor look as much as possible like his counterpart in real life, whereas in Kathakali, the actor and character look least alike i.e. the actor who plays the role of Rama displays little physical resemblance to the actual Rama, because he is mythical and can only be conceived of in the mind. This was probably the practice adopted in the Attic theatre too. The use of masks in Greek drama, for instance, helps to reduce, as in Kathakali and Koodiyattom, the scope of mimesis in the sense of mere copying of externals. This is because the mask uses features that are common to something or someone. For instance, the mask of a monkey may indicate the features of monkeyness in general and thereby represent a type; but the makeup for Hanuman in Kathakali, though not a mask, helps to project an archetypal monkey and not an individual one.
Nineteenth-century realism in the west seems to have gone against these traits of classical art. In early plays of Ibsen and those of Shaw and Galsworthy, the stage is almost an exact replica of its counterpart in life. Neither the costumes nor the dialogue leave anything much to the imagination of the spectator. Such an overcrowding of dramatic determinants, vibhavas, if we may use Indian terminology, interferes with the abiding emotion, bhava and impedes the realisation of the ultimate aesthetic experience, rasa. The mimetic element in these plays, when compared with that in the classical tradition, is definitely a pointer to the distinction between “low” and “high” mimesis respectively.
It is possible to argue that Plato’s theory of Ideas seems to be refuted by the Kathakali performer in the following manner: Plato argued that the Immanent Idea is inimitable and that art fails in its function when it tries to approximate to the idea. This idea, to him, exists solely in the mind. But Kathakali, essentially a poem of the mind, mananakavya, communicates the Platonic Idea, and not the object, through the gestures it employs- there is therefore no virtual imitation of objects as such. It is Plato’s Ideal Bed that is indicated by Kathakali artist when he indicates a square structure. with his hands. But he never calls it a bed-it is the spectator who draws such a conclusion.
The concept of emotional reactions, sattvika bhavas, too seems absent in these forms since they believe that the actor should not absorb the character’s feelings wholly into himself. The sattvika bhavas like trembling, vepadhu and perspiration, sveda, are not enacted on account of the heavy costumes. Such a view springs from the belief that the actor is only a mirror, natyadarpana, used to convey the emotions of the character to the audience in a totally objective, impersonal manner. It is only then that complete stylisation can take place.
In contemporary western theatre too, dramatists like Bertolt Brecht seem to plead for such an alienation between character and actor. The rejection of the Aristotelian notion of empathy is perhaps closer to the Indian theory of non-identification and non-illusionism. This can be illustrated with reference to the acting practice in Kathakali and Koodiyattom, which tries to achieve maximum stylisation and consequent distancing from reality.
Even the setting in Kathakali and Koodiyattom can be considered “representative”, not in the sense of imitating the physical phenomenon, but only in the sense of representing through drama, a union of the earthly with the Divine. The lighted lamp, kalivilakku, placed in front “represents” the Divine, Brahman, the drum-beat, kottu, in the background “represents” the rhythm of creation, while the two incompletely dressed actors behind the half-raised curtain, todayam, “represent” the universe in its process of creation. When this half-curtain is dropped and the fully-costumed actors emerge, creation is “represented” as complete. The imitation of life as portrayed in Kathakali is explained by D. Appukutan Nair thus:
The term anukarana has multiple levels of meaning and offers various interpretations. At the primary level, it is a physical imitation — an imitation of the external appearance and behaviour of a known model. This is mime and tends mostly to evoke laughter, with the mimic looked upon as a clown or jester. Where a model is not readily available, an equivalent model is identified and its form and behaviour are conceived and given shape. This is humanistic and applicable mostly to historical characters. In many dance forms human traits are also ascribed a mythological character and this imitation of form is adapted. Where neither a model nor its equivalent is available, a form is given to conceptual creation. This applies to mythological characters like the ten-headed Ravana or a pseudo-humanised bird like hamsa, the swan. The ten-headed Ravana is actually made up with only one head and it is for the connoisseur to complete his form and figure in his imagination. The next, and ultimate stage in anukarana transcends the mimetic in all aspects at meta-creation through imagination on the basis of the conceived form and behaviour (6).
Such an understanding of these stylised art-forms, entails on the part of the spectator, a certain inferential realisation that art is essentially an interiorised activity. Every image that is perceived should actually be a vital component of his own imagination, a product of his inner self, antahkarana. The Taittiriya Upanishad distinguishes between the various levels of human comprehension, which can also hold good in any appreciation of the aethetic activity too. The five layers, kosas, are:
(1) annamaya (2) pratjarnaya (3) manomaya
(4) budhimaya (5) anandamaya
The primary layer representing annamaya can indicate an appreciation of the purely mimetic, almost behaviouristic meaning, which is at the level of denotative language, abhidha. Pranamaya implies a greater degree of artistic comprehension and appreciation of the art-activity. With budhimaya the intellect takes over and the spectator absorbs the various nuances and subtleties that constitute the sub-text, vyangyartha, of the poetic text. One could argue that most of the best art-appreciators fall under this category. With anandamaya the spectator attains a kind of spiritual oneness with the Divine. When interpreted in the context of aesthetics, we can claim that only at this stage does the spectator succeed in having a Total Vision of the work of art. But perhaps this might come more easily to the traditional Indian spectator or the ancient Greek audience mainly due to the religious-historical themes such art-forms dealt with. The twin ‘acts of internalisation and objectification, which the actor achieves through distancing and universalisation, are positively helpful in attaining this vision.
The five-fold process, pancakosa, can be said to offer a’ parallel to the mimetic activity as described in western theory. Parallel analogies from real-life activities may increase such an understanding of the mimetic process, which ranges from the low and middle to the high or the symbolic/semiotic. This correspondence may be highlighted in the following manner:
pancakosas aesthetic modes analogies semantic categories
annamaya behaviouristic culinary denotative abhidha (physical)
pranamaya naturalistic sexual
(physiological)
manomaya realistic medical figurative laksana
(mental)
budhimaya symbolic intellectual suggestive vyanjana
(intellectual)
anandamaya semiotic spiritual
(spiritual)
A closer look into the nature of this “transformation” with regard to the actor in Indian theatre will help to bring out certain underlying differences between the Indian and Western concepts of aesthetic experience. The actor can and will have to portray a particular individual or an object, according to the demands of the theme and the context. When he does that, he is trying to think and be “like” that object or person, as the case may be. This means that though outside the particular experience, he is actually within it. His function as an artist is therefore a rather complex one, because when he “becomes” another person while acting, he is actually not “imitating” at all. This is an apparent contradiction, but it marks the uniqueness of Indian art.
A striking similarity can be seen between what is often termed in the post-modern era as “mimesis of process” and what is enacted in semiotic art-forms in India like Kathakali. In Kathakali, a scene depicting the preparations for battle, is marked by the blowing of horns and conches and the rhythmic beating of drums. This is enacted by the actor through appropriate gestures since the context warrants such action. But the actual “act” of blowing the horns and beating the drums is done by the drummers, who, though they remain outside the parameters of the plot, remain on the stage, and play on the various instruments in accordance with the gestures of the actor. Here a kind of connection is established between what is outside the scheme of the plot and what is within it. The reader here perceives another dimension and the art-activity becomes self-reflexive in nature.
The method of representation in photography is quite different from that In artistic forms such as have been described above. Roger Scruton analyses the function of photography:
Typically… an attitude toward photography will be one of curiosity, not about the photograph but about the subject. The photograph addresses itself to our desire for the knowledge of the world, knowledge of how things look or seem. The photograph is a means to the end of seeing its subject; in painting, on the other hand, the subject is the means to the end of its own representation. The photograph is “transparent” to its subject… if one finds a photograph beautiful, it is because one finds something beautiful in its subject. A painting can be beautiful, on the other hand, even if it represents an ugly thing. (114)
What is involved in any art-activity, therefore, is an act of turning away from the world while turning towards it. Both the artist and the spectator are able and willing to bear the “tension” of such a paradoxical situation.
It may be said that true art is created only when mimesis is.transformed into semiosis, i.e. when total empathy, bhava, in Indian terms transforms itself in art to an objective, contemplative state, rasa, through aesthetic distance, which involves, more than anything else, the interplay of the imagination, bhavana. While the lowest form of mimesis is essentially behaviouristic in nature, semiosis is often marked by non-mimetic, non-behaviouristic aesthetic modes which deal with the creation of signs. Words, by large, function mostly in a semiotic way, except perhaps onomatopoeic words which are basically mimetic.
The term “semiosis” is used in contemporary art criticism to denote the stylised “distanced” aspect of art, which enables the work to transcend the purely “mimetic”, in its constricted sense. What Roland Posner says about the “aesthetic code” in relation to literary style is of particular relevance to an understanding of the semitic implications of mimesis:
The specific features of aesthetic communication cannot be explained without the assumption that during the processing of the aesthetic message, a special code is developed in the recipient, in addition to the contemporarily valid linguistic and socio-cultural codes. It is this code which enables the recipient to interpret as information vehicles, the non-preceded features which occur in the sign matter and in the level of specific information. Since a code of this kind functions in all aesthetic communications, it is called “the aesthetic code” of the respective work of art. It operates partly with characteristics of the sign matter, partly with characteristics of the message, which are in turn, defined by the linguistic code, the rhetorical code, or other socio-cultural sign systems. The special pleasure one experiences in having contact with a work of art comes from the gradually increasing success one has in the search for the aesthetic code and in deciphering the aesthetic information. (122-123)
It is through the aspect of poetisation that aesthetic codes are increasingly de-automatised and vice-versa. Posner identifies four ways in which mimesis operates in a work like Tristram Shandy.
1. The effect of the representation corresponds to the effect of what is represented.
2. The representation is part of what is represented and one corresponds to the other.
3. The character of what is represented influences the manner of representation.
4. The representation itself influences the character of what is represented (197). These four equations are worked out in any aesthetic communication, like mimesis in art. What Posner calls “semiotic paradoxes” result from this process of communication. The relation between (a) what is represented, (b) the representation, and (c) the effects of representation could be illustrated in the following manner.
Source Object/idea Representation Effect
medium/aim/mode Art
The concept of artistic imitation when traced back to Bharata and Aristotle, seems to have anticipitated most of these features of contemporary criticism. While they seem to converge and diverge at certain points, what is most noticeable is that each seems to complement the other. It would be ideal to view each of them as parts of a whole rather than as complete in themselves. A classification of the most relevant technical terms used in relation to anukrti and mimesis, in their narrowed and broadened senses respectively, will enable a better understanding of this feature of the aesthetic views.
Anukrti lmimesis as copying Anukrti Imirnesis as non copying (attempt to
(attempt to be the other) establish difference from the other)
anukarana anukrti
lokadharmi natyadharmi
abidha vyanjana
vibhava rasa
rasabhasa rasa
personal image
particular universal
flat round
mimesis as Product archetype
realistic symbolic
mimetic semiotic
Absolute mimesis therefore is the object itself, while a state of non-communicability marks absolute semiosis; good art maintains a neat balance between the two. One may define artistic mimesis as a case of “distant resemblance”. If the resemblance is total, there is perhaps no art involved, there is only the object. If the distance is total, there is again no work of art, since there is no object but only the symbol. If imitation entails such a “distant resemblance”, the emphasis would be on the aspect of “distance” and not on “resemblance”.
True art therefore has, as its necessary requisite, an internalisation of the life-object, reaching the level of the mind, sometimes even transcending it and becoming self-reflexive in its function. Since what is imitated in art is an idealised form of the reality of life, art automatically becomes a self-transcendent form of reality. Successful aesthetic imitation therefore amounts to a failure of imitation in its literal sense. It is only when imitation is non-literal and mimeses moves closer towards semiosis that art can be perceived, absorbed and “objectively internalised” in the best possible manner.
REFERENCES:
Nair, Appukuttan D. “A Three-dimensional Poetic Art,” Marg 34.4 (1993).
Posner, Roland. Rational Discourse and Poetic Communication. Berlin: Mouton, 1982. Scruton, Roger, “Photography and Representation,” The Aesthetic Understanding in the Philosophy of Act and Culture. New York: Methuen, 1983.
Contributor:
DHANYA MENON. Teaches English at the Prajoti Nilayam College, Puthukad, Kerala. Has written and published many articles on Indian aesthetics. Has attended conferences and presented papers on comparative aesthetics. Her doctoral thesis was on “Anukrti And Mimesis: An Enquiry Into The Nature Of Art In Bharata and Aristotle.”
TRANSFORMING NATURE IN ART
DHANYA MENON
Abstract: The process of the transformation from life to art no doubt entails corresponding changes in the other aspects of the art activity. This process starts at the level of language and moves up to that of the abiding emotion which determines the nature of the art-experience. Art may be said to transcend the very object whose idea it imitates- art in this sense transcends reality. This paper looks in depth at the various creative and artistic forms of expression that prevail in Indian art. It also draws comparison to the artistic ways of the western body of creativity concepts.
Keywords: imitation art, mimesis, art forms, real life art, western art concepts, Kathakali Koodiyattam, aesthetic communications, aesthetic
“Art imitates Nature” is an oft-quoted statement, which is agreed upon by appreciators of fine art, both in India and the West. This seemingly simple statement carries a host of complex connotations, which a true lover of art is duty-bound to interpret. An attempt is made here to re-interpret the concept of “imitation” in art, which in Sanskrit is referred to as anukrti and in the West is called “mimesis” and to bring out the inherent paradox that exists within these terms.
When examined closely, what “imitation” actually involves is a “denial” of itself, or rather a “reversal” of it. The mimetic process in art may be compared to the reflection of an object in the mirror, which inverts images laterally but not vertically. Similarly when a work of art holds up the mirror to Nature, there is such an inversion or partial reversal of worldly objects. Such a finding does not, however, dismiss the importance of the various mimetic “processes” which transform an aspect of Nature into an artefact; it means that the more of an interiorised activity art becomes, the less “imitative” it becomes, of a particular object or objects in real life.
The process of the transformation from life to art no doubt entails corresponding changes in the other aspects of the art activity. This process starts at the level of language and moves up to that of the abiding emotion which determines the nature of the art-experience. Such a “movement”, from the life-object to the art image, would roughly involve a change from the level of language, through action to that of emotion.
1. Language — plain, abhidha — irony/implied meaning, vyanjana.
2. Action — actor, naṭa character, pātra — spectator, sahṛdaya — stylisation, natya dharmi
3. Emotion — life-emotion, bhāva — art-emotion, rasa.
At the level of language, the progression from the denotative to the implied is effected through suggestion, dhvani, where the implied meaning surfaces by suppressing the literal meaning. The concept of imitation assumes importance in Indian theory in respect of language, since anukrti is viewed there in relation to the structure of language as well as its semantics. It is important in this context to examine how the imitative process operates in the major schools of Indian criticism.
The theory of propriety, aucitya, implies that the attempt in art to imitate an activity suited for a person is realised and fulfilled by identifying that characteristic activity with the person himself. It could be said that according to the theory of aucitya the “activity”, for instance, the conduct of a king, “imitates” the person, the king. The act of imitation, it would then seem, becomes the imitation of the action.
Similarly with the theory of deviant language vakrokti — what cannot be effectively communicated when expressed in a direct way is deliberately expressed in another, less direct way; in a sense therefore the indirect expression, ukti, tries to “imitate” what can be expressed directly, uktam.
So too, with the theory of figurative language alamktara. If one takes the example of simile uparna, it describes an object to be “like” another; here too the process involved is imitation at the language-level. Literature, which itself involves imitation, becomes doubly so when it employs metaphoric language. A kind of language-within-language pattern is found, when, in figure of speech like simile and metaphor, reference to a “likeness” is made within language.
Suggestion, dhvani, also attempts to create an implied sense vyangyartha by “imitating” through a word, sabda, a certain denoted expression. The unstated element which is suppressed within the literal statement, abhidha, gets primacy when dhvani conies into operation. Even an echo, which is essentially a sound, is only an “imitation” of the source of the echo, and becomes diluted with every re-echo.
At the level of action, the total effect is achieved when the movements and gestures are stylised and symbolically presented; in other words, it is. the progression from the normal behavioural pattern, lokadharmi , to conventional gestures, natyadharmi . Even in the verbal art, the activity is once removed from reality, since it is words that are employed to communicate experience instead of real-life objects. In the performing art, gestures are employed in place of words, while in the plastic art, the medium that is used becomes the very agent that distances it from reality. It is only when something which is itself not “real” assumes the role of the real that art becomes aesthetically convincing. The Indian aesthetician brings in the description of the painted horse, citraturaga, to prove this point. The painting of a horse, though not the real horse, is “assumed” to be the real one and is referred to as “that horse” and not “that painting of a horse”. Each life-object therefore has a three-fold function
Horse
(object)
“horse” horse
(word) (painting)
An abnormally dwarfish-looking horse would be artistically “real”, in a given context, while the same in real life could be repulsive. It is the idealised condition, avastha, of “horseness” that gains importance here, just as Aristotle’s idea does, since imitation takes place not of life as it is actually experienced, but as it ought to be experienced. What Aristotle chooses to call the idea may be said to correspond to Bharata’s concept of avastha-in both cases the less relevant aspects or gross details of physical features of what is imitated are eliminated. This implies that imitation in art is always highly selective. The idea or avastha itself becomes a self-transcendental form of reality. Hence art may be said to transcend the very object whose avastha it imitates- art in this sense transcends reality.
In Indian theory, there is a swing from the determinant vibhava, which characterises the personal/particular to the aesthetic emotion, rasa, which characterises the impersonal/universal. At the level of emotion, this movement is effected through impersonalisation, sadharanikarana, by which the particular, vyaktigata, becomes the universal, samastigata. It is acknowledged in the western world too that the art-image could be personal or impersonal, representing the subjective world and the objective world respectively. The more “impersonal” the image, the more universal it tends to be This is an accepted concept in Indian aesthetics and is referred to as sadaranikarana. The movement from one to the other includes within itself most of the western concepts like behaviourism, naturalism and realism, which may be classified under “low” mimesis, leading on to symbolism, myth and archetype, where the point of “high” mimesis is reached.
When the personal image transcends itself and becomes the impersonal art-image, rasa, the imitation, anukrti of various factors can be seen operating simultaneously. Stylisation, distancing and the resultant universalisation can be said to be the most important among these factors, and they are integral to art-criticism in both Indian and western theories. The actor, at least for a brief period of time, tries to “become” the character; here too the process involved is imitation. The audience also tries to assimilate the actor’s performance; in both these cases there is the process of internalisation through imitation. This is what, one can argue, marks the distinctness of Indian art-forms like Kathakali and Koodiyattom.
It would seem paradoxical that the maximum degree of internalisation in these art-forms co-exist with an equal degree of aesthetic distancing. In Kathakali, for instance, the actor is required not to absorb wholly the character’s emotions into himself. He should only create an illusion of portraying any particular emotion-laughter or tears or anger as the case may be-for the next moment he may have to represent a totally different emotion, pakarnnattam. In both Kathakali and Koodiyattam, an actor who represents a character in the act of crying, only moves his fingers over his cheeks and even takes care not to touch the cheeks with the fingers. The rest is left to the responsive imagination, bhavayitri pratiba, of the spectator. The actor therefore merely indicates the emotion. The more there is of such distancing, the more universal the portrayal of emotion becomes. This universality resulting from distancing may be compared to man’s experience of the image of the moon, which, owing to the distance, looks the same size when viewed from anywhere on earth. But a tree, which is much closer than the moon, appears different in size when viewed from different distances.
The same is the case with the costumes, aharyam, in Kathakali and Koodiyattom. It is used to achieve, more than anything else, a maximum possible aesthetic distance. The characters when dressed up do not seem to belong to any particular region, caste or community. In this way the actor achieves a kind of universality. The western concept of realism tries to make the actor look as much as possible like his counterpart in real life, whereas in Kathakali, the actor and character look least alike i.e. the actor who plays the role of Rama displays little physical resemblance to the actual Rama, because he is mythical and can only be conceived of in the mind. This was probably the practice adopted in the Attic theatre too. The use of masks in Greek drama, for instance, helps to reduce, as in Kathakali and Koodiyattom, the scope of mimesis in the sense of mere copying of externals. This is because the mask uses features that are common to something or someone. For instance, the mask of a monkey may indicate the features of monkeyness in general and thereby represent a type; but the makeup for Hanuman in Kathakali, though not a mask, helps to project an archetypal monkey and not an individual one.
Nineteenth-century realism in the west seems to have gone against these traits of classical art. In early plays of Ibsen and those of Shaw and Galsworthy, the stage is almost an exact replica of its counterpart in life. Neither the costumes nor the dialogue leave anything much to the imagination of the spectator. Such an overcrowding of dramatic determinants, vibhavas, if we may use Indian terminology, interferes with the abiding emotion, bhava and impedes the realisation of the ultimate aesthetic experience, rasa. The mimetic element in these plays, when compared with that in the classical tradition, is definitely a pointer to the distinction between “low” and “high” mimesis respectively.
It is possible to argue that Plato’s theory of Ideas seems to be refuted by the Kathakali performer in the following manner: Plato argued that the Immanent Idea is inimitable and that art fails in its function when it tries to approximate to the idea. This idea, to him, exists solely in the mind. But Kathakali, essentially a poem of the mind, mananakavya, communicates the Platonic Idea, and not the object, through the gestures it employs- there is therefore no virtual imitation of objects as such. It is Plato’s Ideal Bed that is indicated by Kathakali artist when he indicates a square structure. with his hands. But he never calls it a bed-it is the spectator who draws such a conclusion.
The concept of emotional reactions, sattvika bhavas, too seems absent in these forms since they believe that the actor should not absorb the character’s feelings wholly into himself. The sattvika bhavas like trembling, vepadhu and perspiration, sveda, are not enacted on account of the heavy costumes. Such a view springs from the belief that the actor is only a mirror, natyadarpana, used to convey the emotions of the character to the audience in a totally objective, impersonal manner. It is only then that complete stylisation can take place.
In contemporary western theatre too, dramatists like Bertolt Brecht seem to plead for such an alienation between character and actor. The rejection of the Aristotelian notion of empathy is perhaps closer to the Indian theory of non-identification and non-illusionism. This can be illustrated with reference to the acting practice in Kathakali and Koodiyattom, which tries to achieve maximum stylisation and consequent distancing from reality.
Even the setting in Kathakali and Koodiyattom can be considered “representative”, not in the sense of imitating the physical phenomenon, but only in the sense of representing through drama, a union of the earthly with the Divine. The lighted lamp, kalivilakku, placed in front “represents” the Divine, Brahman, the drum-beat, kottu, in the background “represents” the rhythm of creation, while the two incompletely dressed actors behind the half-raised curtain, todayam, “represent” the universe in its process of creation. When this half-curtain is dropped and the fully-costumed actors emerge, creation is “represented” as complete. The imitation of life as portrayed in Kathakali is explained by D. Appukutan Nair thus:
The term anukarana has multiple levels of meaning and offers various interpretations. At the primary level, it is a physical imitation — an imitation of the external appearance and behaviour of a known model. This is mime and tends mostly to evoke laughter, with the mimic looked upon as a clown or jester. Where a model is not readily available, an equivalent model is identified and its form and behaviour are conceived and given shape. This is humanistic and applicable mostly to historical characters. In many dance forms human traits are also ascribed a mythological character and this imitation of form is adapted. Where neither a model nor its equivalent is available, a form is given to conceptual creation. This applies to mythological characters like the ten-headed Ravana or a pseudo-humanised bird like hamsa, the swan. The ten-headed Ravana is actually made up with only one head and it is for the connoisseur to complete his form and figure in his imagination. The next, and ultimate stage in anukarana transcends the mimetic in all aspects at meta-creation through imagination on the basis of the conceived form and behaviour (6).
Such an understanding of these stylised art-forms, entails on the part of the spectator, a certain inferential realisation that art is essentially an interiorised activity. Every image that is perceived should actually be a vital component of his own imagination, a product of his inner self, antahkarana. The Taittiriya Upanishad distinguishes between the various levels of human comprehension, which can also hold good in any appreciation of the aethetic activity too. The five layers, kosas, are:
(1) annamaya (2) pratjarnaya (3) manomaya
(4) budhimaya (5) anandamaya
The primary layer representing annamaya can indicate an appreciation of the purely mimetic, almost behaviouristic meaning, which is at the level of denotative language, abhidha. Pranamaya implies a greater degree of artistic comprehension and appreciation of the art-activity. With budhimaya the intellect takes over and the spectator absorbs the various nuances and subtleties that constitute the sub-text, vyangyartha, of the poetic text. One could argue that most of the best art-appreciators fall under this category. With anandamaya the spectator attains a kind of spiritual oneness with the Divine. When interpreted in the context of aesthetics, we can claim that only at this stage does the spectator succeed in having a Total Vision of the work of art. But perhaps this might come more easily to the traditional Indian spectator or the ancient Greek audience mainly due to the religious-historical themes such art-forms dealt with. The twin ‘acts of internalisation and objectification, which the actor achieves through distancing and universalisation, are positively helpful in attaining this vision.
The five-fold process, pancakosa, can be said to offer a’ parallel to the mimetic activity as described in western theory. Parallel analogies from real-life activities may increase such an understanding of the mimetic process, which ranges from the low and middle to the high or the symbolic/semiotic. This correspondence may be highlighted in the following manner:
pancakosas aesthetic modes analogies semantic categories
annamaya behaviouristic culinary denotative abhidha (physical)
pranamaya naturalistic sexual
(physiological)
manomaya realistic medical figurative laksana
(mental)
budhimaya symbolic intellectual suggestive vyanjana
(intellectual)
anandamaya semiotic spiritual
(spiritual)
A closer look into the nature of this “transformation” with regard to the actor in Indian theatre will help to bring out certain underlying differences between the Indian and Western concepts of aesthetic experience. The actor can and will have to portray a particular individual or an object, according to the demands of the theme and the context. When he does that, he is trying to think and be “like” that object or person, as the case may be. This means that though outside the particular experience, he is actually within it. His function as an artist is therefore a rather complex one, because when he “becomes” another person while acting, he is actually not “imitating” at all. This is an apparent contradiction, but it marks the uniqueness of Indian art.
A striking similarity can be seen between what is often termed in the post-modern era as “mimesis of process” and what is enacted in semiotic art-forms in India like Kathakali. In Kathakali, a scene depicting the preparations for battle, is marked by the blowing of horns and conches and the rhythmic beating of drums. This is enacted by the actor through appropriate gestures since the context warrants such action. But the actual “act” of blowing the horns and beating the drums is done by the drummers, who, though they remain outside the parameters of the plot, remain on the stage, and play on the various instruments in accordance with the gestures of the actor. Here a kind of connection is established between what is outside the scheme of the plot and what is within it. The reader here perceives another dimension and the art-activity becomes self-reflexive in nature.
The method of representation in photography is quite different from that In artistic forms such as have been described above. Roger Scruton analyses the function of photography:
Typically… an attitude toward photography will be one of curiosity, not about the photograph but about the subject. The photograph addresses itself to our desire for the knowledge of the world, knowledge of how things look or seem. The photograph is a means to the end of seeing its subject; in painting, on the other hand, the subject is the means to the end of its own representation. The photograph is “transparent” to its subject… if one finds a photograph beautiful, it is because one finds something beautiful in its subject. A painting can be beautiful, on the other hand, even if it represents an ugly thing. (114)
What is involved in any art-activity, therefore, is an act of turning away from the world while turning towards it. Both the artist and the spectator are able and willing to bear the “tension” of such a paradoxical situation.
It may be said that true art is created only when mimesis is.transformed into semiosis, i.e. when total empathy, bhava, in Indian terms transforms itself in art to an objective, contemplative state, rasa, through aesthetic distance, which involves, more than anything else, the interplay of the imagination, bhavana. While the lowest form of mimesis is essentially behaviouristic in nature, semiosis is often marked by non-mimetic, non-behaviouristic aesthetic modes which deal with the creation of signs. Words, by large, function mostly in a semiotic way, except perhaps onomatopoeic words which are basically mimetic.
The term “semiosis” is used in contemporary art criticism to denote the stylised “distanced” aspect of art, which enables the work to transcend the purely “mimetic”, in its constricted sense. What Roland Posner says about the “aesthetic code” in relation to literary style is of particular relevance to an understanding of the semitic implications of mimesis:
The specific features of aesthetic communication cannot be explained without the assumption that during the processing of the aesthetic message, a special code is developed in the recipient, in addition to the contemporarily valid linguistic and socio-cultural codes. It is this code which enables the recipient to interpret as information vehicles, the non-preceded features which occur in the sign matter and in the level of specific information. Since a code of this kind functions in all aesthetic communications, it is called “the aesthetic code” of the respective work of art. It operates partly with characteristics of the sign matter, partly with characteristics of the message, which are in turn, defined by the linguistic code, the rhetorical code, or other socio-cultural sign systems. The special pleasure one experiences in having contact with a work of art comes from the gradually increasing success one has in the search for the aesthetic code and in deciphering the aesthetic information. (122-123)
It is through the aspect of poetisation that aesthetic codes are increasingly de-automatised and vice-versa. Posner identifies four ways in which mimesis operates in a work like Tristram Shandy.
1. The effect of the representation corresponds to the effect of what is represented.
2. The representation is part of what is represented and one corresponds to the other.
3. The character of what is represented influences the manner of representation.
4. The representation itself influences the character of what is represented (197). These four equations are worked out in any aesthetic communication, like mimesis in art. What Posner calls “semiotic paradoxes” result from this process of communication. The relation between (a) what is represented, (b) the representation, and (c) the effects of representation could be illustrated in the following manner.
Source Object/idea Representation Effect
medium/aim/mode Art
The concept of artistic imitation when traced back to Bharata and Aristotle, seems to have anticipitated most of these features of contemporary criticism. While they seem to converge and diverge at certain points, what is most noticeable is that each seems to complement the other. It would be ideal to view each of them as parts of a whole rather than as complete in themselves. A classification of the most relevant technical terms used in relation to anukrti and mimesis, in their narrowed and broadened senses respectively, will enable a better understanding of this feature of the aesthetic views.
Anukrti lmimesis as copying Anukrti Imirnesis as non copying (attempt to
(attempt to be the other) establish difference from the other)
anukarana anukrti
lokadharmi natyadharmi
abidha vyanjana
vibhava rasa
rasabhasa rasa
personal image
particular universal
flat round
mimesis as Product archetype
realistic symbolic
mimetic semiotic
Absolute mimesis therefore is the object itself, while a state of non-communicability marks absolute semiosis; good art maintains a neat balance between the two. One may define artistic mimesis as a case of “distant resemblance”. If the resemblance is total, there is perhaps no art involved, there is only the object. If the distance is total, there is again no work of art, since there is no object but only the symbol. If imitation entails such a “distant resemblance”, the emphasis would be on the aspect of “distance” and not on “resemblance”.
True art therefore has, as its necessary requisite, an internalisation of the life-object, reaching the level of the mind, sometimes even transcending it and becoming self-reflexive in its function. Since what is imitated in art is an idealised form of the reality of life, art automatically becomes a self-transcendent form of reality. Successful aesthetic imitation therefore amounts to a failure of imitation in its literal sense. It is only when imitation is non-literal and mimeses moves closer towards semiosis that art can be perceived, absorbed and “objectively internalised” in the best possible manner.
REFERENCES:
Nair, Appukuttan D. “A Three-dimensional Poetic Art,” Marg 34.4 (1993).
Posner, Roland. Rational Discourse and Poetic Communication. Berlin: Mouton, 1982. Scruton, Roger, “Photography and Representation,” The Aesthetic Understanding in the Philosophy of Act and Culture. New York: Methuen, 1983.
Contributor:
DHANYA MENON. Teaches English at the Prajoti Nilayam College, Puthukad, Kerala. Has written and published many articles on Indian aesthetics. Has attended conferences and presented papers on comparative aesthetics. Her doctoral thesis was on “Anukrti And Mimesis: An Enquiry Into The Nature Of Art In Bharata and Aristotle.”
